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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

RECENT CASES
MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE
By
WALTER

H.

HITCHLER*

The conflict of opinion as to the proper interpretation of the words "wilful,
deliberate and premeditated," as used in the statute defining murder in the first
degree, seemed to have been settled by the case of Commonwealth v. tones, 355
Pa. 522 in which Judge Jones, delivering the opinion of the court, said:
"Apart from the felonious killings which are made murder in the first degree... because perpetrated by means of poison or by lying in wait, or committed
in the perpetration of or the attempt to perpetrate one of the statutory enumerated
felonies, the main distinction of murder in the first degree from that of second
degree lies in the specific intent to take life required for the former. Such intent
jupplies the qualities of wilfulness, deliberation, and premeditation otherwise essential by the statute to murder in the first degree." The import of this statement
is that in a murder case if an intent to kill is discovered, the required deliberation
and premeditation are discovered, because these qualities always exist when the
intent to kill exists. It follows from this that a murder in which the killing was
intentional could not be murder of the second degree.
But the matter seems to have been unsettled by the case of Commonwealth
v. Bey 70 A.2d 343, in which Judge Jones, speaking for the court, said:
"Our review of the law and the evidence confirms that the ingredients necessary to constitute murder in the first degree were proved to exist. The killing was
felonious; the malice plainly inferable; and a specific intent to take life present.
Thus the crime was murder, and having been perpetrated by a wilful, deliberate,
and premeditated killing . ..was murder in the first degree." The import of
this statement is that murder in which there is simply an intent to kill is murder
in the second degree and murder in which there is a deliberate and premeditated
intent to kill is murder in the first degree. An application of this doctrine requires
the court to define the words deliberate and premeditated and the jury to apply
these definitions: "The distinction is so fine," said Cardozo, "that no jury hearing it for the first time can fairly be expected to assimilate and understand it. I
am not at all sure that I understand it myself after trying to apply it for many
years and after diligent study of what has been written in the books." 1
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CONTRACTS-CONSIDERATION: In the case of Mickshaw v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., Inc., of Sharon, Pennsylvania, 166 Pa. Super. 148, 70 A.2d 467
(1950) a returned serviceman recovered the difference in pay between what he
received for his military service and what he would have received had he remained
at home working for the defendant. William Feinberg, manager and secretary
of the defendant, in October 1940 announced to the press that any employee
called to the colors through the conscription law would not lose a cent in wages
since the company was prepared to pay the difference between the government
wages and the employee's present wage. He further stated that the plan would be
continued as long as the man was in service.' The plaintiff was at that time working for the defendant and continued to work for him until 1942, when, after
receiving his draft notice, he enlisted in the Coast Guard. His tour of duty lasted
some thirty-seven months, during which time only the government paid him. He
then returned to work for the defendant, but after working a year, took another
job and then brought this suit.
Plaintiff recovered on the basis of an actual contract. The announcement
by Feinberg appeared in the Sharon Herald and Feinb'erg brought it to the plaintiff's attention. There is no doubt that the announcement was a promise. It was an
undertaking that something should happen in the future, but the question arises
whether or not this was a gratuitous promise, for "if the promisor merely intends to
make a gift to the promisee upon the performance of a condition, the promise
is gratuitous and the satisfaction of the condition is not a consideration for the
contract."2 The court, however, took judicial notice that the growth of war industries during the period between the announcement and plaintiff's enlistment
offered new well-paying jobs, and therefore, that by remaining with defendant
during that period, relying on the promise, the plaintiff was exercising a forbearance amounting to a legal consideration. "It is not enough, however, that the promisee has suffered a legal detriment at the request of the promisor. The detriment incurred must be the 'quid pro quo' or the 'price' of the promise and the
inducement for which it was made." 3 There seems to be some question here as to
whether or not plaintiff's remaining in the employ of the defendant until drafted
was the price of the promise since this particular plaintiff volunteered for the
Coast Guard, and the court states, "There seems to be no reason to infer that any
distinction was intended between service required by the Selective Service Act
and service which was initially voluntary."' Of course this portion of the opinion
1 The Act of May 5, 1933 P. L. 345, art. 3, sec. 315, 15 P. S. 285-315 which declares that
business corporations "may continue the salaries of such of its employees as may have enlisted or
enrolled, or may hereafter enlist or enroll in . . . the military service of the United States" merely
gives a corporation power to so continue the salaries if it sees fit.
- Stelmack et al., Appellants, v. Glen Alden Coal Company, 339 Pa. 410, 414, 14 A.2d 127
(1940).
8 Ibid.

4 Mickshaw v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., Inc., of Sharon, Pennsylvania, 166 Pa. Super. 148,
70 A.2d 467, 469 (1950).
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is important due to the fact that plaintiff did volunteer, and in so doing, would
have disqualified himself under a stricter view, but it also leads to the conclusion
that, if this is true, plaintiff could have volunteered the day following the announcement or an hour after it was shown to him. Could it then be maintained
that the consideration for the promise was the detriment suffered by the employee
in forebearing to take advantage of numerous job opportunities?
The court itself seems to be bothered by this point for they look to two English decisions to support their position. In the first 5 an offer similar to the one
made in this case was made, but in that case only thos'e who were serving or who
may volunteer were offered compensation. The plaintiff, upon learning of the
offer, volunteered. In the second English case 6 the offer was to married men who
joined the army, whereupon the plaintiff joined. I submit that these two cases
are vastly different from the present case. In both of these cases the particular plaintiff did the act requested; he volunteered. In another case 7 where the offer was
similar to that in the first case the court held that there was no consideration for
the defendant's alleged promise, as the plaintiff was already in the army and
would have remained them whether the promise was made or not. 8 It is because
of this that we cannot find a consideration for the promise in the mere act of
being drafted. The plaintiff was already registered under the Selective Service
Act, and, if he had been drafted, would, of course, have been in the military service
wh'ether the promise had been made or not. This was a promise for an act which
was the plaintiff's legal duty, and "An act or forbearance required by a legal duty
that is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest and reasonable dispute if the
duty is owed either to the promisor or to the public, or if imposed by the law
of torts or crimes is owed to any person" is not sufficient consideration for a unilateral contract.
The promise, then, may be considered in three ways.
1. If the promise is taken literally to mean, "When you are drafted, we will
give you the difference in pay as a patriotic gesture," it is a mere gratuitous promise
and imposes no liability upon the defendant company, or it requests an act that
the plaintiff was already bound to do and therefore is not sufficient consideration
for a unilateral contract.
2. If no distinction was meant between service required by the Selective Service Act and service which was voluntary, then the promise could be construed as
meaning, "If you will volunteer, we will see that you will not lose a cent in wages."
Plaintiff's act of volunteering, even though he had already received notice to reDavies v. Rhondda District Urban Council, 87 L. J. K. B. 166, 117 L. T. 622 (1917).
Budgett v. Stratford Cooperative & Industrial Society, Ltd., 32 T. L. R. 378 (1916).
Sanderson v. Workington Borough Council, 34 T. L. R. 386, 68 Sol. Jo. 535 (1918).
8 Cf. Rex v. National Arbitration Tribuna.. Ex Parte Boulton Corporation, 2 K. B. 405 (1941).
9 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 76 (a) (1933).
5
6
7
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port for his selective service examination, would constitute sufficient consideration to bind the company to their promise. This is comparable to the English cases.
3. If a distinction is meant between service required by the Selective Service Act and service which is voluntary, and notice can be taken of the job opportun-

ities, then the promise is substantially, "If you remain in our employ until you are
drafted we will compensate you," and the plaintiff by volunteering would not have
fulfilled the condition and would not have accepted the offer. However, any
employee who was drafted would, in this case, be entitled to the compensation.
The court, in this case, reached a result that is satisfying to a sense of justice,

however, and as the court said, "It is well to remember that, in addition to securing the benefits of better employee morale and loyalty, appellant by publicizing this
promise to its employees was actively seeking the valuable good will of its customers and of the entire community." 10 To allow the defendant to escape liability
under these circumstances would be clearly unjust."

John Woodcock, Jr.
10 Mickshaw v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., Inc., of Sharon, Pennsylvania, 166 Pa. Super. 148,
70 A.2d 467, 469 (1950).
11 Under the Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 600, 65 P. S. 112, 113 as amended by the Acts of June
25, 1941, P. L. 207, 65 P. S. 112, 113 and April 21, 1942, P. L. 50, 65 P. S. 112 and May 6, 1942,
P. L. 106, 65 P. S. 112 public officials and employees who were drafted or who volunteered were
granted, if they had dependents, additional compensation by the state to make up for the loss of
income while in the service under certain circumstances. In Kuriz v. City of Pittsburgh, 346 Pa.
362, 31 A.2d 257, 154 A. L. R. 1143 (1943) the sections of the acts relating to the additional compensation were held to be unconstitutional. The Act of May 6, 1942, P. L. 101, 24 P. S. 2152 gave
the same advantages to public school teachers but the amount was "the difference between his regular salary and the salary paid to his substitute." The amount could not exceed $2000 and the employee got nothing if his army pay was more than his civilian wage.
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INSURANCE-INTEREST OF THE BENEFICIARY AS AGAINST THE
ESTATE OF THE INSURED ON PLEDGED LIFE INSURANCE: The recent
case of In re Wilson's Estate' gives the answer to a question which has long been
2
unsettled in Pennsylvania and one which has provoked not a little comment.
The question is this: Where a life insurance policy has been pledged as
collateral security for a loan, what are the rights of the beneficiary named therein
against the estate of the insured if the debt is paid from the insurance proceeds? The
following facts from the Wilson case quite aptly illustrate the problem:
S had borrowed money from a bank on a note secured by collateral consisting,
inter alia, of assigned life insurance policies. The policies were on the life of S
and were payable to designated beneficiaries. The insured had reserved the right
to assign and to change the beneficiaries. S died. His estate was solvent. The executors paid the debt out of assets of the estate which thus released the collateral
and the policies were re-assigned.
From this follows the question: Do the proceeds of the insurance become
part of decedent's estate, or are they payable to the designated beneficiaries? Favoring the latter, the court answers this in the words of Mr. Justice Allen M. Stearne,
who says:
"Decedent . . . merely assigned the insurance policies as collateral for
his loan. As with any other collateral, when a loan is repaid the collateral
is returned to the owner. Had the creditor bank used decedent's . . .
insurance collateral to liquidate its loan, the designated insurance beneficiaries could have enforced their claim against the estate of the decedent
under their right of subrogation, to the same extent as if they had been
the original creditor."
This clear and unequivocal language leaves no doubt as to the present position of the Pennsylvania Court on the subject. Whatever doubt may have remained
as a result of the decision in the Fidelity Trust Co. case,2 which appeared to support a contrary view, is completely erased in a comment designed to distinguish
this case. In referring to the Fidelity case the court said:
"In that case the facts were exceptionally complicated. They need
not be herein recited. It will suffice to state that the insured, while insolvent, made fraudulent transfers of insurance policies for th'e purpose
of defrauding his creditors. This Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice
Linn, directed the rescission of the fraudulent transfers and that the insurance fund be paid into the estate for the benefit of general creditors...
In the present case there was neither allegation nor proof of fraud."
1 363 Pa. 546, 70 A.2d 354 (1950).
2 See FIDUCIARY Ravzzw, October 1945, p. 4. An excellent and extensive discussion of the

topic referring specifically to the problem as it existed before the recent ruling is found in 51
Dic.

L. REv. 255.

3 Fidelity Trust Company, Administrator v. The National Union Bank of Pittsburgh, 313 Pa.
467, 169 A. 209 (1933).
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As a rsult of the Wilson case, then, the rule in Pennsylvania may be stated
thus: Where a life insurance policy has been pledged by the insured as collateral
security for a debt, without a fraudulent purpose, the designated beneficiary has a
right against the insured's estate if the debt is withheld from the proceeds. There
does not appear any basis for a distinction as to whether the debt is owed to the
insurance company or to a collateral assignee.
Bartel E. Ecker
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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-DEFINITION OF "BOTTLE" AS
USED IN CITY ORDINANCE: In Otto Milk Co. v. City of Washington, et al., 1
the question presented to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for decision was whether
paper milk containers were "bottles" within the meaning of an ordinance of the
City of Washington. 2 That ordinance provided that "Pasteurized Milk shall be
delivered to the consumer in bottles only.. ." In 1947 the Milk Company had taken
out its glass bottling machinery and had inserted machinery for packaging milk in
Pure-Pak paper containers, in which they began distributing milk. Thereupon the
local Board of Health threatened the Milk Company with prosecution and revocation
of its health permit. Plaintiff, having fully qualfied to sell milk under the laws of
Pennsylvania, brought suit to have defendant "enjoined from enforcing the Milk
Ordinance contrary to its true intent and in such a manner as to prohibit or interfere with the use of 'paper milk bottles.' "
The lower court found that the Pure-Pak containers woere not "bottles" as
that word was used in the Milk Ordinance, and plaintiff appealed.
Using as a springboard the Statutory Construction Act of 1937,8 which provides that words and phrases should be construed "according to ruies of grammar
and according to their common and approved usage," Chief Justice Maxey, writing
for the court, found that "bottle" must of necessity include Pure-Pak containers.
Being a question of first impression to the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, in
compliance with the statutory provision above referred to, reached into Webster's
New International Dictionary and The Century Dictionary and Encyclopedia to
find that a "bottle" is a hollow mouthed vessel for holding and carrying liquids.
This showed that the identifying characteristics of a bottle are its form and function,
and not its, composition. The dictionaries also admitted that tht word "bottle" is
now so loosely used that its limit of application could not well be defined. This led
the Chief Justice to make the following statement:
"The fact that to most people nowadays the word 'bottle' may convey the idea of a container made of glass is not decisive of the question
before us. Bottles were among the first things used by primitive man.
They were in common use long before men knew how to make glass
bottles. The identifying characteristics of any object are not its composition but its form and function."
It was contended that the paper container was objectionable in that it was
opaque, thereby rendering impossible detection of deleterious matter contained
in the milk. This did not persuade the court, which responded that such argument was inconsistent with the fact that the ordinance did not require the bottle
to be transparent. Thus even black bottles might have been unobjectionably used,
1 363 Pa. 243, 69 A.2d 399 (1949).
Ordinance No. 57, adopted by the Council of the City of Washington on July 22, 1925.
8 Act of May 28, 1937, P. L. 1019, art. Il, 33, 46 P. S. 533.

2-Milk
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provided they were made of glass. The court added that if the City of Washington
had desired to restrict the delivery of milk to bottles which were transparent, it
should have so stipulated in the Ordinance.
The decision seems to be entirely correct in this writer's opinion. Furthermore,
it is in accord with what appears to be the federal view. In Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc.,
v. City of Chicago et al.,' the Federal District Court of Illinois held that single
service paper containers were "standard milk bottles" as that term was used by a
Chicago ordinance. It will be noted that in this case the court held, not only that
paper containers were bottles, but also that they were standardmilk bottles. In holding that they were standard bottles, the court recognized that through custom and
usage the paper container had become widely accepted by city authorities as well
as by the public generally.
While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court suggested that the City of Washington might have provided that milk should be delivered in transparent bottles only,
they added that such restriction would have to be a valid exercise of the police
power;' that it would have to accord with public necessities; 6 and that it could
not interfere with the enjoyment of individual rights beyond the necessities of
the case.' And the determination of whether the police power has been validly
exercised rests with the courts. 8
The court refused to express an opinion on this question, but the decision
does seem to indicate that the court has sanctioned the use of the paper container
for the distribution of milk and that they will protect its use in the future. By
way of a footnote to the opinion, the court states that in attempting to justify a
city ordinance prohibiting the delivery of milk in paper containers, on the grounds
of reasonableness and necessity for the protection of the public, the city would be
faced by the fact that the Secretary of Health of Pennsylvania has approved the
use of paper containers for the distribution of milk throughout the state.
From this case, then, it would appear that the use of paper containers for the
distribution of milk can no longer be validly objected to or prohibited in Pennsylvania.
Donald E. Wieand
4 35 F. Supp. 451 (1940).
5 Flynn et al. v. Horst, 356 Pa. 20, 5t A.2d 54 (1947). See also California Reduction Company v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U. S. 306, 26 Sup. Ct. 100, 50 L. Ed. 204 (1905).
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
9 White's Appeal, 287 Pa. 259, 134 A. 409, 53 A. L. R. 1215 (1926).

